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Writing Different Lyrics to the Same Old
Tune: The New (and Improved) 1997
Amendments to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act
Deidre McGrath
For the past quarter-century, the world has watched in-
tently the activities of tuna fishermen in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific (ETP), an oceanic area extending from the coasts of Cali-
fornia to Chile to Hawaii. This interest stems from the history
of purse seine fishing (also called "setting") in the ETP and the
United States embargo imposed under the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act of 1972 (MMPA),1 which forbids such fishing meth-
ods in order to protect the dolphins that swim with schools of
tuna. Purse seine fishing entails setting out huge nets, up to a
mile in circumference, which can be drawn up like a purse, trap-
ping tuna and dolphins inside the net.2 ETP purse seine fishing
practices have resulted in the deaths of over six million dolphins
since 1959.3 Mutilation and drowning are the most common
causes of death.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1361-1421h (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
2. See ALESSANDRO BONANNO & DOUGLAS CONSTANCE, CAUGHT IN THE
NET: THE GLOBAL TUNA INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND THE STATE 123(1996). The practice was invented by the United States fishing fleet, specifically
by.fishermen in the San Diego area. See id. at 124. It is generally regarded as
an economical and efficient manner of catching fish. See Elise Miller, Com-
ment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Conflicting Duties Under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1991).
3. See The Provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Act, How
It Is Affecting Dolphin Mortality, and What Measures Can Be Effected to Keep
the Mortality to a Minimum: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wild-
life and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
60 (1996) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings I] (statement of Suzanne
Iudicello, Vice-President for Programs, Center for Marine Conservation). Some
think this is a low estimate because it does not account for the dolphins killed
by sharks while entangled in the net or deaths that occur after dolphins escape
the net and are still disoriented. See Nancy Kubasek et al., Protecting Marine
Mammals: Time for a New Approach, 13 UCLA J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 1, 5 (1994-
95).
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The passage of the MMPA represented an implicit decision
that the lives of dolphins were more valuable than trade rela-
tions with ETP countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Vanu-
atu. Although environmentalists hailed the statute as proof of
the "growing strength of the ecology movement in the United
States,"4 the embargoed countries complained bitterly.5 Per-
haps all the complaining paid off. On August 15, 1997, Congress
amended the MMPA with the passage of the International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA), which at least
temporarily lifts the tuna embargo against the ETP countries.6
Under the amended Act, the Secretary of Commerce is called
upon to evaluate both the success of ETP countries in adopting
alternative fishing practices and the effects of setting on today's
dolphin population, in order to determine whether the embargo
should be lifted indefinitely.7 The IDCPA also redefines the
term "dolphin-safe" to mean that no dolphins were observed
"killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments
in which the tuna were caught."8
The original MMPA represented "a collective decision that
when the price of tuna is too many dead dolphins, the price is too
high-we won't buy."9 Environmentally conscious legislators
considered the death of a single dolphin to be an exorbitant price
to pay for tuna. With the passage of the IDCPA, Congress has
struck a balance between the demands of international trade
and concern for marine mammal life.
This Note analyzes whether the new legislation addresses
traditional concerns regarding the MMPA and its amendments.
Part I surveys the history of the MMPA leading up to the intro-
duction and passage of the IDCPA. Part II outlines the terms of
the IDCPA as they differ from the original legislation. Part III
discusses traditional criticisms of the MMPA, as well as the ar-
guments against amending the MMPA, and questions whether
4. Laurence Iliff, Conservation or Conspiracy?: Mexican Tuna Embargo
Theories Ignore Environmental Concerns, Bus. MEx., Apr. 1991, at 27, 27.
5. The Mexican government, for example, set up an office in Washington
D.C. with the sole purpose of lobbying Congress to lift the tuna embargo. See
Mexico Scores Senate's Failure to Lift Embargo on Yellowfin Tuna, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1576 (Oct. 9, 1996).
6. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
42, 111 Stat. 1122 (1997).
7. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(g) (West Supp. 1998).
8. Id. § 1385(d)(1)(D).
9. Christopher B. Stone, The Environment & the Law: Panel Ill-Interna-
tional Law, Global Environmentalism, and the Future of American Environ-
mental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 502 (1994).
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the IDCPA responds appropriately to those issues. This Note
concludes that, through the IDCPA, U.S. legislators have at-
tempted to cater to both sides of the trade-environment debate
in an equitable and novel manner. The IDCPA makes a bona
fide attempt to deal with most of the current and historical con-
cerns about the tuna/dolphin debate. Of all the amendments to
the MMPA,10 this one has the greatest potential for success.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MMPA
A. THE EMBARGO AND ITS TERMS
The numerous amendments to the MMPA" and the difficul-
ties inherent in balancing the needs of the environment with the
goals of international trade, have made it clear that legislating
on such matters is no easy task. There are a variety of divergent
interests involved in any environmental debate, and the MMPA
is no exception.' 2 "Animal rights groups, consumers, members
of the U.S. tuna industry, and those involved in international
trade" are examples of groups affected by the MMPA.' 3 None-
theless, Congress took a definitive stance almost entirely on the
side of the environmental interests with the passage of the
MMPA.
The stated goal of the MMPA is to eradicate all dolphin kills
taking place at the hands of commercial fishermen.' 4 To achieve
that goal, legislators passed an embargo on tuna fish imports
from any country using "commercial fishing technology which
results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean
10. The MMPA has been amended by, inter alia, the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755; the
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, Pub. L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat.
4467 (1990); the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-523, 106 Stat. 3425; the Marine Mammal Health and Stranding Response
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-587, 106 Stat. 5059 (1992); and the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108 Stat. 532. For gen-
eral background on the amendments, see Don Mayer & David Hoch,
International Environmental Protection and the GATT: The Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 187 (1993).
11. See supra note 10.
12. See Jennifer Ramach, Note, Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling: Are the Dol-
phins Finally Safe?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 743, 745 (1996).
13. Id.
14. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). The clause
reads: "In any event it shall be the immediate goal that the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of com-
mercial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero
mortality and serious injury rate .... " Id.
19981 433
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mammals in excess of United States standards."15 In order to
export tuna to the United States, ETP countries needed to prove
that they had adopted a regulatory program "comparable to that
of the United States" for the prevention of dolphin kills and that
the average level of dolphin deaths at the hands of commercial
fishermen was "comparable to the average rate of incidental tak-
ing of marine mammals by United States vessels."1 6 Under no
circumstances, other than for scientific, educational, or replen-
ishment purposes, could a marine mammal designated as "de-
pleted" be taken in the course of business. 17
In 1992, Congress passed the International Dolphin Conser-
vation Act (IDCA), which offered tuna exporters exemption from
the MMPA embargo in return for their participation in a five-
year moratorium on the setting on and encircling of dolphins.1 8
The terms of the moratorium included the establishment of an
international research program on alternative methods of har-
15. Id. This embargo is also known as a "countermeasure." See Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental Law: Implica-
tions for United States Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 273, 281 (1994). The
United States is one of the world's primary users of countermeasures. See id.
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, the decision to impose a countermeasure is a purely political one. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF T=E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 905 cmt. h (1986). The judiciary is in no way involved. See id. Hence, U.S.
courts will never participate in the decision about how to deal with an infrac-
tion of an international duty. See id.
Through the MMPA, Congress declared it illegal to import "[any fish,
whether fresh, frozen, or otherwise prepared, if such fish was caught in a man-
ner which the Secretary [of Commerce] has proscribed for persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," regardless of whether any dolphins were inci-
dentally killed in the course of the practice. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1372(c)(3) (West 1985
& Supp. 1998).
16. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). "Comparable regulatory program" is
defined as one having prohibitions against encirclement by nets and sundown
setting of dolphins. See id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I). "Comparable average rate of
incidental taking" means an incidental taking rate not greater than two times
that of domestic vessels up to the end of 1989, and not greater than 1.25 times
the U.S. rate of 1990 and thereafter. See id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
17. See id. § 1371(a)(3)(B). The Secretary of Commerce determines which
marine mammals are "depleted." See id.
18. See International Dolphin Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106
Stat. 3425 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1411-1418 (West 1985 & Supp.
1998); see also Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities
for GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247,
259 (1996). The IDCA provides for re-implementation of the ban should the
Secretary determine that a country is not abiding by its commitments. See 16
US.C.A. § 1415(b)(1). It should be noted that under the Bush administration,
none of the targeted countries subscribed to the moratorium. See Subcommit-
tee Hearings I, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Suzanne Iudicello).
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vesting tuna and Secretarial reports to Congress on the results
of the research, along with the assurance by each concerned
country that research on dolphin-safe fishing methods would
continue. 19
The MMPA contained two exceptions to the general ban
against setting on dolphins. The first was the "Good Samaritan"
exemption, which excused the taking of a dolphin when "immi-
nently necessary to avoid serious injury, additional injury, or
death to a marine mammal entangled in fishing gear or deb-
ris."20 The second exception was that general permits could be
issued for taking marine mammals in particular circum-
stances. 21 Exceptional circumstances justifying general permits
included takings for "scientific research, public display, photog-
raphy for educational or commercial purposes, or enhancing the
survival or recovery of a species or stock."22 Marine mammals
could also be taken by certificate holders in the process of testing
suggested improvements in tuna fishing methods and equip-
ment.23 Finally, the Secretary of Commerce could issue permits
for takings occurring during commercial fishing expeditions. 24
The special permit awarded to the American Tunaboat As-
sociation is a prime example of a controversial application of the
commercial fishing exemption. Scholars have criticized the per-
19. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(b)(2)-(3), 1413(a). The annual reports by the
Secretary on the progress of the moratorium were also to include, among other
things, "a description of the status of stocks of yellowfin tuna," and assessments
of the moratorium regarding its "economic impacts on the tuna industry and
consumers" and its "effectiveness .. .in protecting dolphin populations in the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean." Id. § 1414(1)(2)-(4).
20. See id. § 1371(d)(1). Reasonable care must be taken to protect the
marine mammal from further injury, and the taking must be reported to the
Secretary of Commerce within forty-eight hours of its occurrence. See id.
§§ 1371(d)(3)-(4).
21. See id. § 1374(a). The permit system is generally headed by the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), under the supervision of the Secretary of
Commerce. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1071.
22. Id. § 1371(a)(1). However, permits for the furtherance of scientific re-
search will provide for the "lethal taking" of dolphins or other marine mammals
only if no other research method exists which will spare the life of a marine
mammal. See id. § 1374(c)(3)(B).
23. See id. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(v).
24. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2), 1374. Congress authorized the American
Tunaboat Association (ATA) to take marine mammals, provided that the fleet
used "the best marine mammal safety techniques and equipment that are eco-
nomically and technologically practicable." Id. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(ii). It should be
noted that the ATA is the only domestic entity to have received a permit from
the Secretary, suggesting that they are not freely given to any commercial fish-
ing entity applying for one. See Yechout, supra note 18, at 250.
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mit exception for directly conflicting with the purpose behind the
MMPA, as it allows incidental takings by commercial fishermen
in some instances.25 These permits are troublesome to many be-
cause they create a double standard: the restrictions are en-
forced more stringently on foreign fleets than on some fishermen
within the United States' exclusive economic zone.26 Basically,
the permits make legal the very action which the MMPA pur-
ported to prohibit.27 It is unfair to expect foreign colleagues to
respect U.S. laws that contain exceptions for domestic entities.
The original MMPA was not intended to apply to foreign
fishing fleets; instead, the law was meant to regulate domestic
fishing practices.28 Therefore, in order to avoid the statute's ap-
plication, domestic vessels often sailed under foreign flags.29
They accomplished this by flying "flags of convenience," meaning
that they temporarily exhibited the flags of foreign countries,
with which the ships had no formal association, in an attempt to
foil authorities. 30 Essentially unrestricted, foreign ships had
relatively fewer observers on board, and were not bound to use
only dolphin-safe fishing techniques.31 Congress passed the em-
bargo to circumvent this activity and protect the over 100,000
dolphins being killed every year by foreign fleets and domestic
fishermen sailing under foreign flags.32 It took a suit by a deter-
mined environmental group, the Earth Island Institute (EII), to
bring the MMPA to the level of enforcement that Congress had
intended.33
25. See Susan C. Alker, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing
the Approach to Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 527, 536 (1996).
26. See James Joseph, Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean: Biological, Economic, and Political Impacts, 25 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1,
25-26 (1994).
27. See Alker, supra note 25, at 536.
28. See Yechout, supra note 18, at 251.
29. See id. This also raised a question of liability under the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. According to the Restate-
ment, a state may be responsible for the consequences of failing to apply its own
environmental laws against domestic entities. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601 cmt. d (1986).
30. See Mayer & Hoch, supra note 10, at 204 n.124.
31. See id. at 204.
32. See id. Fleets from Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and Vene-
zuela were responsible for the majority of these incidental deaths. See id.
33. At the outset the Commerce Department was extremely hesitant to im-
pose the embargo against any country, even when credible evidence of illegal
setting on dolphin existed. See id. at 205. The Department felt pressure from
the newly regulated fishing industry to relax enforcement of the MMPA, so the
regulations were largely ignored for the first five years of the statute's exist-
ence. See id. However, in Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, District Judge
[Vol. 7:431
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Before the 1997 amendments, the Act banned the importa-
tion into the U.S. of tuna from Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Ja-
pan, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. 34 This embargo
proved to be very expensive for those countries that continued to
set on dolphin, with the Mexican tuna industry estimating its
losses between $30 and $40 million each year.35 The embargo
had a serious effect on Venezuela, too, given that country's tradi-
tional reliance on the United States as the market for over half
of its ETP tuna catch. 36
The MMPA also implemented a secondary embargo against
any country attempting to export fish products originally im-
ported from an embargoed state.37 The exporting country was
required to provide the United States with reasonable proof that
it had not imported any banned tuna or tuna products within
the past six months.38 A secondary embargo can devastate both
the secondary nation and the original target of the embargo. 39
Henderson of the Northern District of California granted ElI's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction requiring stronger implementation of the ban against coun-
tries practicing purse seine fishing. See 746 F. Supp. 964, 969 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
The court agreed with ElI's contention that the importation of tuna from coun-
tries like Mexico should be enjoined until the Secretary of Commerce deter-
mined that foreign death rates did not exceed two times that of the United
States. See id. at 976. By failing to uphold the terms of the embargo, the Secre-
tary had interfered with the statutory scheme of the MMPA, "assur[ing] the
continued slaughter of dolphins." Id. at 975. The decision was praised as a ma-
jor step for the U.S. environmental movement.
There was some concern about the jurisdictional reach of the Mosbacher
decision, however, because it originated from a U.S. District Court and not the
Court of International Trade, which has exclusive jurisdiction over civil cases
dealing with embargoes in the United States. See Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave &
Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RES.
J. 957, 960-61 (1993). Nonetheless, this issue has not discredited the holding of
the case.
34. See Administration Official Urges Rapid Passage of Tuna/Dolphin
Bill, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 764 (May 8, 1996).
35. See Mexico Scores Senate's Failure to Lift Embargo on Yellowfin Tuna,
supra note 5, at 1576.
36. See Raul Pedrozo, The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992:
Unreasonable Extension of U.S. Jurisdiction in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean Fishery?, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 113 (1993).
37. See U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
38. See id.
39. This is especially true for Mexico and Venezuela, the two biggest tuna
exporters in the ETP. See BONANNO & CONSTANCE, supra note 2, at 203-04.
Mexico, for example, exports only about twelve percent of its tuna catch to the
United States. See Iliff, supra note 4, at 28. Hence, with the application of the
secondary embargo to the rest of Mexico's market, non-ETP countries will be
less enthusiastic about buying excess tuna from Mexico for export to the United
States, which will seriously impair Mexico's ability to sell tuna other than for
domestic consumption. Mexican losses arising out of the secondary embargo
1998]
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The secondary embargo extended the effect of the primary em-
bargo to about twenty other countries, totalling approximately
$266 million in U.S. tuna imports.4 0
B. DEFINING "DOLPHIN-SAFE"
The MMPA was amended in 1992 to ban the sale, purchase,
offer of shipment, or transport of any tuna not considered
dolphin-safe. 41 Congress codified the definition of "dolphin-safe"
and the responsibilities inherent in selling such tuna in the
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).4 2
Under the DPCIA, tuna harvested in the ETP is considered
dolphin safe if 1) the Secretary has determined that the vessel
which caught the fish is incapable of using its purse seine nets
for setting on dolphin, or 2) the product contains written confir-
mation by the captain of the ship, the Secretary or Secretary's
designee, or a representative of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC) that no tuna were caught using a
purse seine net.43 Therefore, tuna caught on the high seas
through driftnet fishing or tuna caught in the ETP with purse
seine nets could not be sold legally as "dolphin-safe."44
Dolphin safe labeling began as a voluntary, "single attri-
bute" scheme, since it was originally used to share "'positive' en-
vironmental information," namely that no dolphins were killed
in catching the tuna.45 However, upon passage of the Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, the offering of dolphin-
safe tuna became a prerequisite to entrance into the U.S. tuna
market, effectively turning the voluntary scheme into a
mandatory one.4 6 Unfortunately, despite the "dolphin-safe"
have been estimated at approximately $57 million per year, assuming total
compliance with the MMPA on the part of the intermediary nations. See
Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 114.
40. See BONANNO & CONSTANCE, supra note 2, at 201.
41. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1417(a)(1); see also Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or
Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in
the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 251 (1996).
42. Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 901, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West Supp. 1998)).
43. See id. §§ 1385(d)(2)(A) & (B)(i)-(iii). Tuna that is labeled as dolphin-
safe, but, in fact, is not, violates section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
See id. § 1385(d)(1).
44. See id. § 1385(d)(1)(A)-(B).
45. Staffn, supra note 41, at 215.
46. See Musgrave & Stephens, supra note 33, at 971.
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tuna requirement, dolphin-unsafe practices did not entirely
cease in reportedly "dolphin-safe" hauls.4
7
C. THE GATT INCIDENT
EI v. Mosbacher48 became a source of contention for most of
the ETP countries, as it was the first legal proceeding to impose
the embargo to the letter. Shortly after Mosbacher was decided,
Mexican officials protested the MMPA and DPCIA before a
GATT dispute resolution panel (Tuna ).49 They requested that
the Panel find the primary and secondary embargoes under the
MMPA to violate GATT Article XI, which prohibits quantitative
restrictions generally.50 Additionally, the Mexican delegation
asserted that the Panel should find the DPCIA inconsistent with
Article XI and unjustified under GATT.51 The United States de-
fended the MMPA by arguing that it was consistent with the
exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g),52 which allow for discrimina-
tory measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health" or "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources," respectively. 53 Although the GATT Panel could not
unilaterally overrule United States law, 54 such controversial
press coverage would not bode particularly well for the reputa-
tion of the MMPA in the eyes of the international trade
community.
The Panel found that the Article XX(b) exception of the
GATT did not cover actions outside the jurisdictional borders of
the United States, and, even if it had, "[t]he United States had
not demonstrated to the Panel ... that it had exhausted all op-
47. See Ramach, supra note 12, at 775 (reporting that Greenpeace has
claimed that dolphin encirclement still occurs in some "dolphin-safe" hauls).
48. 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
49. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna 11. For an in-
depth discussion of the findings of the dispute resolution panel, see Mayer &
Hoch, supra note 10.
50. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 3.1, at 161. Article XI states that "[n]o
prohibitions or restrictions.., whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signa-
ture Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. XI:I [here-
inafter GATT].
51. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 3.3, at 161.
52. See id. 3.6, at 162.
53. GATT, arts. XX(b) and XX(g). The dispute panel rejected both these
arguments. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 5.32, at 200-01.
54. See Iliff, supra note 4, at 28.
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tions reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the General Agree-
ment."55 Similarly, with regard to the Article XX(g) exception,
the Panel held that "[a] country can effectively control the pro-
duction or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only
to the extent that the production or consumption is under its
jurisdiction."56
The final blow for the MMPA came from the Panel's inter-
pretation of GATT Article III:4, which calls for equal treatment
and opportunities for imported products in the domestic mar-
ket.57 The Panel understood this to mean that regulations of
imports must deal with their qualities as a product, and the
standards espoused by the MMPA dealing with "the taking of
dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect
tuna as a product."58 This has come to be known as the process-
product distinction.5 9 Under GATT, a country may regulate a
product only as a product, yet the process by which the product
comes to be falls outside the purview of any regulation.60
The Mexican challenge to the DPCIA, on the other hand, did
not succeed. The GATT Panel upheld the "dolphin-safe" provi-
sions as consistent with the General Agreement since, at that
time, the labeling requirements were still voluntary.61 This
meant the legislation did not hamper import access to the U.S.
market.62 Hence, the subsequent passage of the IDCA seems to
55. Tuna I, supra note 49, 5.28, at 199.
56. Id. 5.31, at 200. This limited jurisdiction argument regarding Article
XX has recently been extended to the U.S. Endangered Species Act, which bans
imports of shrimp harvested in a manner dangerous to the well-being of sea
turtles. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU,
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L
L. 231, 242 (1997).
57. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 5.12, at 194.
58. Id. 5.15, at 195.
59. This is not the first time the process-product distinction has been ap-
plied to a trade dispute between GATT members. A resolution panel found in
the early 1950s that a Belgian law requiring a tax levy on all publicly made
products imported from countries with substandard family allowance systems
was a violation of GATT. See Alan Isaac Zreczny, The Process/Product Distinc-
tion and the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy: Greening the GATT Through Interna-
tional Agreement, 1 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 79, 93 (1994). Because the United States
did not clearly differentiate between the product at issue and the process of
harvesting it, the Panel found no choice but to condemn the embargo. See id. at
87.
60. See Yechout, supra note 18, at 255.
61. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 5.42, at 203.
62. See id.
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have put the MMPA in further violation of GATT principles,
since it mandated dolphin-safe labeling.
Despite Mexico's victory before the GATT Panel, Mexican
government officials chose not to pursue the formal adoption of
the panel findings, largely because of the difficulties such an ac-
tion would introduce to NAFTA negotiations. 63 Instead, Mexi-
can and U.S. negotiators decided to pursue a bilateral and
mutually acceptable solution to this particular trade-environ-
ment dilemma. 64 However, the EU and the Netherlands
brought their own challenge before another GATT dispute reso-
lution panel two years later (Tuna i/).65 Again, the Panel found
that the MMPA violated GATT.66 This time the violation
stemmed from the fact that GATT prevents measures "taken so
as to force other countries to change their policies with respect
to persons and things within their own jurisdiction."67 Although
the reasoning behind the rejection of the MMPA differed in this
instance, criticism from academics and environmentalists alike
mounted against the GATT's seemingly anti-environmental
stance.68
D. THE MOVE TO ABOLISH THE EMBARGO
The International Dolphin Conservation Program Act of
1997 arose out of the decision between Mexican trade officials
and Congress to negotiate an alternative to a complete tuna em-
bargo. The International Dolphin Conservation Program, also
known as the La Jolla Agreement, was formulated and signed
63. See Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United
States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and
Other International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12 (1994).
For such a panel finding to be binding on each country, it must be officially
adopted by the full GATT council. See Mayer & Hoch, supra note 10, at 218.
64. See McLaughlin, supra note 63, at 12-13.
65. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)
[hereinafter Tuna II].
66. See id.
67. Id. 5.24, at 894.
68. See, e.g., Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Uni-
lateral Trade Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499,
2532 (1996) ("The panel's statement implied that states, by joining the GATT,
had elevated the right to market access above other competing rights, including
a country's sovereign right to protect the environment.... [That] conclusion...
deserves serious scrutiny"); Mayer & Hoch, supra note 10, at 192 ("We conclude
that the GATT should be amended to allow for some extra-territorial applica-
tions of domestic environmental law").
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shortly after Tuna I was resolved. 69 The International Dolphin
Conservation Act, which arose out of the agreement in 1992,
created the five-year moratorium measure under the MMPA.70
Despite the terms of the accord and the attempt to amend
the MMPA once again, the MMPA remained in place for another
five years, largely due to Congress' inability to find an accepta-
ble compromise. 71 The United States and the purse seining
countries in the ETP met at the bargaining table again in 1995,
leading to the drafting of the Panama Declaration.72 This agree-
ment sets out the relative obligations of all twelve signatories in
their collective attempt to protect dolphins in the ETP.73 In re-
turn for international recognition of these obligations, the
United States agreed to revise its definition of "dolphin-safe" in
the MMPA.7 4 This became the impetus for the IDCPA.
The first draft of amendments (known as the Stevens/
Breaux bill) was largely rejected by both environmental groups
and members of Congress.75 Complaints surfaced regarding the
provisions allowing for the immediate redefinition of "dolphin-
69. Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pa-
cific Ocean (EPO), June 1992, 1 U.S.T. 230, 33 I.L.M. 936 [hereinafter IDCP.
The Program purported to set dolphin mortality limits for all participating
countries "equivalent to 19,500 divided by the total number of qualified vessels.
Id. at 938. A "qualified vessel" was one identified by its government as having a
carrying capacity of more than 400 short tons and being likely to engage in
purse seine fishing within the eastern Pacific. See id.
70. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412. (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). Keep in mind that
the IDCA is not the same as the IDCPA. This paper deals only with the latter.
The IDCA arose out of the 1992 amendments to the MMPA and the La Jolla
Agreement, while the IDCPA arose out of the La Jolla Agreement and the Pan-
ama Declaration, which was a direct result of the La Jolla Agreement.
71. See Mexico Scores Senate's Failure to Lift Embargo on Yellowfin Tuna,
supra note 5, at 1576.
72. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No 105-
42, § 2(a)(1), 111 Stat. 1122, 1122 (giving effect to the Panama Declaration,
which was signed Oct. 4, 1995, in Panama City). The text of the Panama Decla-
ration is available at <http://www.greenpeaceusa.orglcampaigns/biodiversity/
panama.html>.
73. See House Subcommittee Sends Tuna-Dolphin Bill to Full Panel, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 697 (Apr. 16, 1997). Signatories of the Pan-
ama Declaration include Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Panama, Spain, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 2(a)(1), 111 Stat. at
1122.
74. See House Subcommittee Sends Tuna-Dolphin Bill to Full Panel, supra
note 73, at 697. The definition was to be changed so that "any given haul of
tuna that had no associated dolphin mortality (as certified by an observer) could
bear the dolphin-safe label." Id.
75. See New Bill Would Allow Cheap Tuna to Flood U.S., Earth Island
Says, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1976 (Nov. 29, 1995).
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safe."76 The current version of the amendments passed largely
because the change in the definition of dolphin-safe is postponed
until the Secretary of Commerce determines that purse seine
practices do not have an adverse effect on dolphin populations in
the ETP.77 If no adverse effects are determined to exist as of
December 2002, the dolphin-safe label will simply provide that
no dolphins were "observed killed or seriously injured" in that
particular tuna haul. 78
Thus, out of a law dedicated to the unwavering protection of
all dolphins from the nets of purse seiners comes an amendment
allowing for purse seine fishing, but only if no dolphins are in-
jured in the process. The change in policy seems to honor the
widespread interest in protecting dolphins, while recognizing
that international trade is too valuable to compromise unilater-
ally. The Agreement represents significant progress in resolving
the trade-environment debate, but the compromise has yet to
prove itself as a completely satisfactory one.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION
PROGRAM ACT OF 1997
A. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE
ACT
Congress enumerated three major purposes for enacting the
IDCPA, each of which gives rise to substantial changes in the
terms of the MMPA.79 The first stated purpose is "to give effect
to the Declaration of Panama... including the establishment of
the International Dolphin Conservation Program, relating to the
protection of dolphins and other species, and the conservation
and management of tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean."80 The Panama Declaration delineates specific "dolphin
and ecosystem protection commitments."8 ' The crux of the Dec-
laration is the understanding that each signatory nation will
have a maximum dolphin mortality rate of 5,000 per year, and
76. See Mexico Scores Senate's Failure to Lift Embargo on Yellowfin Tuna,
supra note 5, at 1576.
77. See Compromise on Tuna/Dolphin Bill Approved Unanimously by Sen-
ate, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1354 (Aug. 6, 1997).
78. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
79. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
42, § 2(a), 111 Stat. 1122, 1122 (1997).
80. See id. § 2(a)(1).
81. Tuna/Dolphin Measure Sent to Full Resources Committee, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 682 (Apr. 24, 1996).
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each will work to steadily decrease its relative dolphin mortality
rate to zero.8
2
In order to successfully implement the International
Dolphin Conservation Program, the Panama Declaration signa-
tories set out three objectives:8 3 1) the embargo on yellowfin
tuna must be lifted; 2) the American tuna market must be
opened to those nations that comply with the terms of the IDCP
and seek and/or secure membership in the Inter-American Trop-
ical Tuna Commission (IATTC);8 4 and 3) the definition of
dolphin safe must be changed to an observed mortality stan-
dard.8 5 Besides providing for a 5,000 annual dolphin mortality
cap, the IDCP also strives to establish a "per-stock per-year
dolphin mortality limit . . .through calendar year 2000, at a
level between 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent of the minimum popu-
lation estimate" for that particular species of dolphin.86 After
the year 2000, the per-stock per-year limit must be at 0.1 per-
cent or lower.87 If any of these requirements are not met, set-
ting on dolphin of the particular stocks affected is prohibited for
the remainder of the year.88 Finally, the IDCP calls for assess-
ments by the Secretary of Commerce of the relative success of
signatory countries in meeting these goals in the years 1998 and
2000.89 The Secretaries of State and Commerce are charged
with developing and securing promises from foreign countries to
implement the IDCP.90
82. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 2(b)(4).
83. See Sen. Ted Stevens, Senate Approves Tuna-Dolphin Measure, Con-
gressional Press Release, July 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12101757.
84. The IATTC is made up of the United States, France, Japan, Venezuela,
Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vanuatu. See Subcommittee Hearings I,
supra note 3, at 61 (statement of Suzanne Iudicello). It is headquartered at the
Scripps Institute of Oceanography in La Jolla, California, and is largely fi-
nanced by the United States. See Yechout, supra note 18, at 261 n.101. The
Commission was established in 1950 pursuant to a fishing agreement between
the United States and Costa Rica. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 95. The
IATTC was relatively quiet until the 1970s, when it began taking a more active
role in the regulation of incidental dolphin killings in the ETP. See id.
85. See Stevens, supra note 83.
86. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, sec. 302(2), § 6(c)
(codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(2) (West Supp. 1998)). "Per-stock per-year
dolphin mortality limit" means that every year until the year 2000, for every
type (stock) of dolphin swimming in the ETP, the mortality rate cannot exceed
0.2 percent of the minimum population estimate for that particular stock.
87. See id. sec. 302(3), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (3)).
88. See id. sec. 302(4), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(4)).
89. See id. sec. 302(5)-(6), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)-(6)).
90. See id. sec. 302, § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412).
444 [Vol. 7:431
MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
The Secretary of Commerce plays a key role in implement-
ing both the International Dolphin Conservation Program and
the IDCPA. The Secretary is charged with conducting research
to determine whether marine mammal populations will be ad-
versely affected (which occurs when mortality rates exceed re-
production rates) under the terms of the IDCPA.9 1 Should an
adverse effect become apparent, the Secretary is to notify the
IATTC at once and "prescribe emergency regulations to reduce
incidental mortality and serious injury and mitigate such ad-
verse impact."92 The content of these "emergency regulations" is
not clearly defined in the text of the amendment. However, the
content of the research is prescribed. 93 The research, which
commenced on October 1, 1997, should consist of "population
abundance surveys,"94 "stress studies,"9 5 and other issues con-
cerning the economic and bycatch effects (i.e. the effects on ani-
mals other than dolphins) of purse seine fishing.96 For the most
91. See id. secs. 303(c)(1), 304(a)(1), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1413(c)(1), 1414(a).
92. Id. sec. 303(c)(1), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)(1)).
93. See id. sec. 304(a)-(b), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1414a (a)-(b)).
94. Id. sec. 304(a)(2), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1414a (a)(2)). These
surveys will determine the relative abundance of any stocks previously found to
be depleted, and they will be conducted three times in the next three years. See
id.
95. Id. sec. 304(a)(3), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1414a (a)(3)). These
studies determine the biological and psychological effect of intentional encircle-
ment on dolphin stocks. See id.
96. See id. sec. 304(b)(2), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1414a (b)(2)).
Namely, the Secretary should adduce:
(A) projects to devise cost-effective fishing methods and gear so as
to reduce, with the goal of eliminating, the incidental mortality and
serious injury of marine mammals in connection with commercial
purse seine fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean;
(B) projects to develop cost-effective methods of fishing for mature
yellowfin tuna without setting nets on dolphins or other marine
mammals;
(C) projects to carry out stock assessments for those marine mam-
mal species and marine mammal stocks taken in the purse seine fish-
ery for yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, including
species or stocks not within waters under the jurisdiction of the United
States; and
(D) projects to determine the extent to which the incidental take of
nontarget species, including juvenile tuna, occurs in the course of
purse seine fishing for yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean, the geographic location of the incidental take, and the impact of
that incidental take on tuna stocks and nontarget species.
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part, environmentalists support the agenda set out under the
IDCPA.97
The Secretary is generally in charge of issuing regulations
with the intention of effecting the provisions of the IDCP.98 The
content of the regulations is diverse. There are observer re-
quirements for each vessel,99 rules setting out various dolphin-
safe procedures, and a ban on intentional dolphin-setting in ac-
cordance with the IDCP. 100
97. See Mexican Fishermen Hail Senate Vote on Tuna Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1997, at A5 (reporting that the World Wildlife Fund, the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, and Greenpeace all expressed support for the Senate bill ver-
sion of the IDCPA); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and
Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. - (1997) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearings II] (statement of Nina M. Young, Marine Mammalo-
gist, Center for Marine Conservation, reiterating support of the above groups
and adding that the National Wildlife Federation is also a proponent).
98. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec. 303(a)(1),
§ 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413 (a)(1)).
99. The observer requirement is not new. The National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) implemented an observer requirement intended to police tuna
fishing practices and provide an accurate measure of dolphin mortality levels
shortly after the passage of the MMPA. See Joseph, supra note 26, at 3. The
authority of the NMFS to require observers on all domestic vessels was chal-
lenged as a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit rejected the constitutional challenge and
held that the NMFS has the authority to place the observers on board. See id.
at 759. The observer requirement was deemed to be an "adequate substitute for
a warrant" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 765-66.
100. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec.
303(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)). Other
terms include:
(iv) requiring the use of special equipment, including dolphin safety
panels in nets, monitoring devices as identified by the Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Program to detect unsafe fishing
conditions that may cause high incidental dolphin mortality
before nets are deployed by a tuna vessel, operable rafts, speed-
boats with towing bridles, floodlights in operable condition, and
diving masks and snorkels;
(v) ensuring that the backdown procedure during sets of purse seine
net on marine mammals is completed and rolling of the net to
sack up has begun no later than 30 minutes before sundown;
(vi) banning the use of explosive devices in all purse seine operations;
(vii) establishing per vessel maximum annual dolphin mortality lim-
its, total dolphin mortality limits and per-stock per-year mortal-
ity limits in accordance with the International Dolphin
Conservation Program;
(viii) preventing the making of intentional sets on dolphins after
reaching either the vessel maximum annual dolphin mortality
limits, total dolphin mortality limits, or per-stock per-year mor-
tality limits;
(ix) preventing the fishing on dolphins by a vessel without an as-
signed vessel dolphin mortality limit;
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The second purpose of the IDCPA is to eliminate the tuna
embargo against all nations in compliance with the IDCP and,
consequently, the Panama Declaration. 10 1 The amendment spe-
cifically repeals the language in the MMPA requiring that "[tlhe
Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commer-
cial fish or products from fish which have been caught with com-
mercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards."10 2 This, of course, also lifts the secondary
embargo provisions.
The final purpose underlying the IDCPA is U.S. recognition
of the "significant reductions" achieved by ETP nations "in
dolphin mortality associated with that fishery."10 3 Congress
specifically found that dolphin mortality in the ETP has de-
creased markedly since the initial passage of the MMPA, "from
hundreds of thousands annually to fewer than 5,000 annu-
ally."10 4 This decrease is largely due to increased recognition of
the importance of environmental protection by lesser-developed
countries in the ETP and positive action on the part of ETP
countries to strengthen adherence to environmental protection
policies.' 0 5
(x) allowing for the authorization and conduct of experimental fish-
ing operations, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary
may prescribe, for the purpose of testing proposed improvements
in fishing techniques and equipment that may reduce or elimi-
nate dolphin mortality or serious injury...;
(xi) authorizing fishing within the area covered by the International
Dolphin Conservation Program by vessels of the United States
without the use of special equipment or nets if the vessel takes
an observer and does not intentionally deploy nets on, or encircle,
dolphins, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary may
prescribe; and
(xii) containing such other restrictions and requirements as the Sec-
retary determines are necessary to implement the International
Dolphin Conservation Program with respect to vessels of the
United States.
Id. sec. 303(a)(2)(B)(iv)-(xii), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(2)(B)(iv)-
(xii)).
101. See id. § 2(a)(3).
102. See id. § 4(a)(2). The quoted language was deleted from 16 U.S.C.
1371(a)(2) (1994).
103. Id. § 2(a)(2).
104. Id. § 2(b)(1).
105. Mexico, for example, has developed and passed five major environmen-
tal statutes, along with 87 sets of regulations setting various quality standards
for everything from fuel to water to noise. See Steinberg, supra note 56, at 251.
Also, with the creation of Mexico's Office of the Attorney General for Environ-
mental Protection has come the hiring of over 500 environmental inspectors.
See id.
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Specifically, as of 1993, Mexican dolphin mortality rates
matched those of the United States. l06 Mexican authorities ac-
complished this largely through mandating that tuna fleets em-
ploy special equipment and techniques, providing and requiring
"extensive training" for everyone on board, and intensifying pen-
alties for the violation of set regulations. 10 7 The IDCPA also es-
tablishes a mandatory observer requirement for all fishing
vessels in order to ensure full compliance with the law. l08 Ac-
cording to some estimates, Mexican fishing fleets kill less than
one dolphin in every tuna shoal netted. 10 9
B. A CHANGED MEANING BEHIND THE WORDS "DOLPHIN-SAFE"
Section 5 of the IDCPA amends the Dolphin Protection Con-
sumer Information Act. It applies to purse seine fishing both
within and outside the confines of the Eastern Tropical Pa-
cific. 110 As for purse seine practices within the ETP, a fishing
boat employing purse seine technology will be considered
dolphin-safe if "the vessel is of a type and size that the Secretary
has determined . . . is not capable of deploying its purse seine
nets on or to encircle dolphins," or, alternately, "the product is
accompanied by a written statement executed by the captain
providing the certification required under subsection (h)."111
Subsection (h) states that the requisite certification must aver
"that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets
in which the tuna were caught."112 Also, the captain must cer-
tify that an authorized observer accompanied the captain and
crew for the duration of the harvest and that the observer did
not see any dolphins killed or seriously injured.113
106. See Fact Sheet: Mexico's Marine Conservation Efforts, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE DISPATCH, May 1, 1994, at 18.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Must Try Harder, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 22. One of the
preeminent technologies now used in purse seining is the installation of "safety
panels" which protect the dolphins from becoming entangled in the tuna net.
See Kurt Kleiner, Mexico Fishes For End to Tuna Ban, NEW SCIENTIST, May 25,
1996, at 10. After the tuna have been encircled, part of the net is lowered, and
scuba divers are dispatched to help lead the dolphins out of the net, free of any
injury. See id.
110. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 5(a) (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998)).
111. Id. § 5(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(2)(A)-(B)).
112. Id. § 5(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(h)(1)).
113. See id. § 5(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(2)(B)(ii)).
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It is still a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act to falsely label a tuna product as "dolphin-safe." 114
Tuna will be considered dolphin-safe only if no dolphins suffered
death or serious injury in the haul. 1 5 Fishing fleets seeking to
implement dolphin safety labels also need an effective "tracking
and verification program" to support the claim of dolphin safety,
and the label must be in total compliance with all Federal Trade
Commission requirements." 6
The definition of "dolphin-safe" could be amended to reflect
these new terms as early as March of 1999 or as late as July of
2001. 17 Whether the definition is amended depends on the out-
come of the Secretary's dolphin impact studies."" If the Secre-
tary determines through sound evidence in the preliminary
stage that no depleted dolphin stocks have suffered a significant
adverse effect from revised purse seining practices, the defini-
tion will change immediately in 1999.19 If that determination
cannot be sufficiently proven until the final outcome of the stud-
ies in 2001, the definition will change at that point.' 20 If it ap-
pears that depleted stocks continue to be threatened, a new
compromise may have to be reached. 12 '
C. BYCATCH REDUCTION IssuEs
Besides reducing dolphin mortality to negligible levels, the
Panama Declaration seeks to minimize the number of nontarget
species, or bycatch, inadvertently killed by purse seine nets and
other, more "dolphin-friendly" fishing techniques.' 2 2 Victims of
bycatch include young fish, birds, turtles, and whales.' 23 Very
often, juvenile tuna are bycatch victims, which impairs the tuna
114. See id. § 5(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(3)(C).
115. See id. § 5(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(3)(C)(i)).
116. See id. § 5(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(3)(C)(ii)-(iii)).
117. See Allan Freedman, After Compromise, Dolphin Deal Sails Through
Senate, House, CONG. Q. Wimy. REP., Aug. 2, 1997, at 1862, 1863.
118. See id. The Secretary is expected to review the stock levels and assess
progress and any recommendations to further the objectives of the statute. See
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec. 302 (4)-(5), § 6(c), (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(4)-(5)).
119. See Freedman, supra note 117, at 1863.
120. See id.
121. See generally International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec.
303(c)(1), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)(1)).
122. See Phillipe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Dolphin Bycatches
in Tuna Fisheries: A Smokescreen Hiding the Real Issues?, 27 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 333, 337 (1996).
123. See id. at 339.
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population's ability to sustain itself.124 In most circumstances,
the bycatch population is not utilized in any way and is simply
left to die. 125 This raises economic concerns as well, since the
tuna business is one of the most important commercial fishing
operations in the world.' 26 Therefore, it is unsurprising that the
drafters of the IDCPA would choose to address the issue of by-
catch reduction.' 27
The bycatch reduction provisions require the Secretaries of
State and Commerce to "establish standards and measures for a
bycatch reduction program for vessels fishing for yellowfin tuna
in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean."1 28 The agreed-upon pro-
gram should include four measures:
(1) to require, to the maximum extent practicable, that sea turtles and
other threatened species and endangered species are released alive; (2)
to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the harvest of nontarget
species; (3) to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the mortality
of nontarget species; and (4) to reduce, to the maximum extent practi-
cable, the mortality of juveniles of the target species. 129
These are the primary terms of the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act as it amends the MMPA and the
Tuna Conventions Act. The IDCPA represents not only a com-
promise between the House of Representatives and the Senate,
but a bargain between international interests as well. 130 The
unilateral embargo will be lifted only if the formerly embargoed
states are in full compliance and agreement with the terms of
the Panama Declaration as presented in the IDCPA.1' 3 Addi-
tionally, the State Department must certify that, along with
adopting the International Dolphin Conservation Program
under the Panama Declaration, the foreign states have dolphin
protecting legislation in place. 132
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 340.
127. The amendments regulating bycatch levels actually apply to the Tuna
Conventions Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 951-962 (1994) and not the MMPA. However,
the terms of the amendments are contained in Pub. L. No. 105-42, along with
the rest of the terms of the IDCPA.
128. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, sec. 15, § 7(c) (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C.A. § 962 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
129. Id.
130. See Compromise on Tuna /Dolphin Bill Approved Unanimously by Sen-
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III. A SURVEY OF NEW AND TRADITIONAL CRITICISMS
OF U.S. DOLPHIN PROTECTION AND AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE IDCPA'S RESPONSES
Two schools of criticism have developed concerning the
MMPA. The first stems from foreign interests in economics and
international standards of conduct. The second arises out of in-
ternal concerns about the viability of the MMPA and the need
for environmental protection in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. An
examination of these criticisms both illuminates the deficiencies
of the MMPA and highlights the improvements implemented by
the 1997 amendments.
A. UNILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL ENFORCEMENT & THE
RECOGNITION OF LDC NEEDS
Unilateral enforcement of laws and regulations involves the
policymakers of one country, usually a powerful and wealthy
one, imposing its own laws, will, and developmental require-
ments on less-powerful, less-developed countries (LDCs). The
original MMPA was largely unilateral, in that Congress alone
decided to ban tuna from countries engaging in purse seine
methods. Multilateralism, on the other hand, involves informed
decisions and policymaking from sources in all countries in-
volved in the issue at hand. Compromise and the recognition of
the needs of countries at various levels of development are usu-
ally the norm.
Critics of the MMPA claim that the United States used the
statute to wrongly impose its economic will outside its own juris-
diction. 133 Under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, a nation is forbidden from "ex-
ercis[ing] jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person
or activity having connections with another state when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." 134 The Restatement
enumerates eight factors to consider in determining the reason-
ableness of an extrajurisdictional regulation.135 These include
the strength of the link between the activity and the regulating
states and the character of the activity being regulated. 136 The
argument follows that the MMPA does not satisfy these require-
ments because its negative effects on the international commu-
133. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 102.
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(1) (1987).
135. See id. § 402(2)(a)-(h).
136. See id. The text lists the other factors as follows:
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nity outweigh the United States' interest in regulating the
dolphin mortality rate, and purse seine fishing bears no "direct
and substantial effect 'upon' the United States."137
Traditionally, unilateral trade measures have been largely
disfavored within the trade community and by GATT, especially
when the purpose is to force change in another country's domes-
tic policy. 138 The fundamental principles underlying the Tuna
II decision show that unilateral environmental trade measures
will rarely survive GATT scrutiny. 39 Since the United States,
like any other player in the international arena, has an interest
in maintaining international order, the viability of the "might
makes right" approach is truly questionable. 40
LDCs have argued that they were cheated under the MMPA
because they were expected to place economic development
projects on hiatus in favor of costly environmental projects
which produce little, if any, revenue. 141 Developed countries
have traditionally pressured LDCs to forego steps in their indus-
trialization processes and implement environmental standards
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is un-
reasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including,
where appropriate:
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic ac-
tivity, between the regulating state and the person principally respon-
sible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those
whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c).. .the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the ex-
tent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regu-
lating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
137. Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 102-03.
138. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2518; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 905 cmt. a (1987) ("In general,
international law encourages the settlement of legal disputes by negotiation or
third-party resolution, and discourages self-help unless it becomes necessary").
139. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2523.
140. See LouAnna C. Perkins, International Dolphin Conservation Under
U.S. Law: Does Might Make Right?, 1 OcEAN & COASTAL DEV. 213, 250 (1995).
141. Mexico, Colombia and Vanuatu have all complained that the IDCA rep-
resented nothing more than a costly, unilateral infringement on their sover-
eignty and their fishing industries. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 106.
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before they became economically feasible. 142 Developing coun-
tries generally favor multilateral approaches to dolphin conser-
vation, as multilateralism calls for a team approach and shifts
some of the cost and burden to the developed countries, which
can better afford it.143
International commentators have found merit in the LDC
position, recognizing that the original MMPA and IDCA "com-
pletely ignore[d] the social and economic impact that the elimi-
nation of purse seine fishing [would] have on lesser developed
countries."144 Others point to the fact that developing countries
are more dependent on the sea for sustenance and revenue than
are industrial countries. 145 Thus, the development of a thriving
tuna industry gives LDCs a better chance of surviving in an in-
creasingly trade-dependent world. 146
Proponents of unilateral environmental -trade actions tout
the MMPA and similar legislation as an acceptable alternative
when global coordination is not possible.' 4 7 Precisely because of
the common international interest in protecting the global com-
mons, unilateralism can be attractive. 148 In addition, these
142. See Sheila C. Lahey, Trade & the Environment, 16 N.Y. SCH. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 181, 182 (1996).
143. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 107.
144. Id. at 106; see also Lahey, supra note 142, at 191 ("According to one
observer, those in the comfort of the North [developed countries] have never
considered the needs of the people in the Southern nations [LDCs] that they
seem to want to govern").
Some commentators have suggested that the North develop "aid packages"
to ease the financial burden on the South of adopting environmental protection
measures like eco-labeling. See Staffin, supra note 41, at 280. In fact, the devel-
oping nations themselves have asked for financial and technological aid "in ex-
change for a consensus on trade-environment topics of interest to the North."
Steinberg, supra note 56, at 244.
145. See Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 122, at 338. Citizens of devel-
oping countries depend more on fish to supplement their daily diet, and the
artisanal fishing industry is much more prominent in LDCs than in industrial-
ized nations. See id. at 340.
146. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 124-25.
147. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2519-20.
148. See id. at 2518. Put another way,
A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities
within its jurisdiction or control... conform to generally accepted in-
ternational rules and standards for the prevention, reduction, and con-
trol of injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 601(1)(a) (1987).
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types of actions are often the least controversial in dealing with
international issues. 149
The IDCPA strikes a middle ground between these two
viewpoints, but shows an obvious affinity for a new multilateral
approach to dolphin protection. 150 The amendments recognize
the necessity of scientific input and the need for compromise be-
tween industrial and developing countries. 151 According to the
legal director for Defenders of Wildlife, "the compromise recog-
nizes that scientists rather than trade bureaucrats or politicians
should set the standards."152 This is apparent in the detailed
studies to be undertaken by the Secretary and the newfound
concentration on bycatch issues. 53 Congress made a real at-
tempt to recognize strides made by LDCs in dolphin protection,
thereby addressing the argument that the MMPA has tradition-
ally ignored LDC needs and preferences.' 54 Lesser-developed
participating countries had some control over the terms of the
Act because it was based on the Panama Declaration, which was
negotiated multilaterally in the first place.' 55 LDCs had a voice
in adopting the impetus for the IDCPA, and nothing in the Act
suggests that the collective "voices" of ETP countries are any
less valid than that of the United States.
Nonetheless, hints of unilateral action still exist, most nota-
bly in the provisions allowing the Secretary of Commerce to re-
introduce the embargo should a country exceed its 5,000-dolphin
mortality cap or should ETP practices adversely affect dolphin
populations. 5 6 There are also unilateral undertones to the pro-
visions granting the Secretary the authority to make determina-
tions regarding the effectiveness of the IDCPA. Still, because
149. See Stone, supra note 9, at 503. Unilateral trade enforcement measures
have been used in the Montreal Protocol and the Convention on International
Trade of Endangered Species, as well as the MMPA. See Fox, supra note 68, at
2520. However, "[tihe principle of necessity ordinarily precludes measures
designed only as retribution for a violation and not as an incentive to terminate
a violation or to remedy it." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES § 905 cmt. f (1987).
150. Given that the IDCP is based on a bargain (acceptance of terms for
discontinuance of embargo), multilateralism is readily apparent.
151. See Freedman, supra note 117, at 1863.
152. Id.
153. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec. 304, § 6(c)
(codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1414a (West 1985 & Supp 1998)(studies); id. sec. 15,
§ 7(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A § 962).
154. See id. § 2(a)(2), (b)(1).
155. See id. § 2(a)(1).
156. See id. sec. 302(4), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(4)); see also id.
sec. 303(c), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)).
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the IATTC plays a prominent role in the process, the unilateral
flavor of the IDCPA is tempered somewhat.
157
The drafters of the IDCPA were wise to retain a soft unilat-
eral undertone in the statute while adopting a much more multi-
lateral viewpoint in the actual terms of the Act. Strictly
unilateral measures reappear only if a country is lacking in its
compliance requirements. This creates an incentive for ETP
countries to comply and may help to ensure that foreign govern-
ments will take the statute seriously.
The Tuna I and Tuna II panels made it clear that multilat-
eral action was essential to the continued viability of the MMPA.
Countries are much more likely to willingly comply with the
terms of an agreement when teamwork and voluntary action are
the mode. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the de-
veloped countries are the ones with greater experience in imple-
menting successful environmental regulation, as well as the
ones with the money necessary to make the program work on a
large scale. Although the United States' environmental suc-
cesses are generally domestic measures, the multilateral provi-
sions of the Act will allow the United States to work with
countries like Vanuatu in determining the best alternatives
given specific foreign conditions. Domestic experience paired
with assertive foreign environmental goals should bring positive
results. The drafters of the IDCPA recognized the competing in-
terests within the international marketplace. Because legisla-
tors remained open to the desires of global trade advocates, the
IDCPA should enjoy greater compliance without forcing the
United States to completely forego its traditional leadership role
in the area. Trade in tuna products is restored between the
United States and countries with purse seine fleets in the ETP,
and U.S. dolphin protection standards are not entirely compro-
mised in the process.
B. THE MMPA As AN EXCUSE TO INTERFERE WITH FOREIGN
TUNA INDUSTRIES
In Tuna I, one of Mexico's arguments against the MMPA
was that it represented nothing more than a blanket attempt to
157. The IATTC assists the Secretary in his studies of the effects on dolphin
species stock (see id. § 4(b)(3)(C) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2)(C)(ii))), is
immediately notified of any adverse effects found by the Secretary (see id. sec.
303(c)(1)(A), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)(1)(A))), and "address[es]
the actions necessary to reduce incidental mortality and serious injury and mit-
igate the adverse impact which resulted in the determination" by the Secretary
(id. sec. 303(c)(5), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)(5))).
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interfere with the potentially prosperous Mexican fishing indus-
try. 158 According to the United States, the law's only objective
was to protect dolphins from death at the hands of foreign and
domestic fleets.' 59 It is an unavoidable truth that the embargo
did have some adverse effects on the ETP states; hence, one ulte-
rior motive for the legislation may well have been economic pro-
tectionism. For instance, Mexico and Venezuela have
historically run the largest purse seine fleets in the ETP. 160
Had they accepted the terms of the International Dolphin Con-
servation Act moratorium, their fleets probably would have gone
bankrupt, given their lack of financial resources at the time.16 1
Heavy decreases in employment levels and Mexican tuna con-
sumption levels inevitably would have followed.16 2
The legislative history of the MMPA also suggests that the
statute was not motivated solely by a desire to save dolphins. 163
Dolphin protection may have been the primary motivation, but
it was not the only one. "Legislative history reveals that in
strengthening the import prohibition provisions of the MMPA,
Congress was motivated in part by a concern that, faced with
weaker regulations, the foreign fleet was enjoying an unfair
competitive advantage relative to the U.S. fleet."164 Certain
United States officials have even privately agreed that protec-
tionism was a cognizable interest underlying the MMPA. 165
These facts take on even more importance when one realizes
that, prior to the decision in EII v. Mosbacher, the U.S. purse
seine fleet dominated the ETP.166 After that decision, the U.S.
fleet suffered a sharp decline in status and productivity. 67 Au-
thorities assert that the noticeable decrease in the size and
strength of the domestic fleet was due to various economic im-
pediments, including the practice of domestic ships "reflagging"
under foreign sails. 168
158. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 3.57 at 1610.
159. See id.
160. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 114-15.
161. See id. at 115.
162. See id.
163. See Stephen Fleischer, The Mexico-US Tuna/Dolphin Dispute in
GATT: Exploring the Use of Trade Restrictions to Enforce Environmental Stan-
dards, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 536 (1993).
164. Id.
165. See Must Try Harder, supra note 109, at 22.
166. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 104.
167. See id.
168. See Caroline E. Couilston, Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce:
Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Its Effect on
Dolphin, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT'L L. 97, 120-21 (1990).
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It would have been very expensive for the U.S. fishing in-
dustry to move its operations out of the ETP to areas where dol-
phins and tuna do not associate. 169 Hence, the fact that
Mexican ships could continue to fish in the ETP, while the
Americans could not, gave Mexico an unacceptable advantage in
tuna harvesting.170 By leveling the playing field and imposing
the embargo without exception, Congress could have been at-
tempting to rescue a once-lucrative domestic industry on the
edge of economic ruin.17'
The IDCPA directly confronts the core of this argument by
abolishing the tuna embargo. The changing definition of
"dolphin-safe" also addresses protectionism concerns, since the
definition is essentially relaxed under the new legislation. 172
The Act retains its original purpose, however, by continuing to
place a higher priority on the protection of dolphins than on the
interests of the fishing industry.'7 3 ETP nations are unlikely to
comply with an environmental statute like the MMPA if they
think it is a front for less respectable goals on the part of the
United States. Thus, the lifting of the tuna embargo does well to
ease LDC concerns about U.S. protectionism.
C. NONCONFORMITY WITH GATT POLICIES
The expansive scope of both GATT panel decisions strongly
suggests that the General Agreement disfavors environmental
trade measures.174 After all, the panel in Tuna I explicitly
stated that Article XX did not apply outside a country's own bor-
ders, 17 which "effectively prohibit[ed] the United States and
other environmentally conscious countries from influencing the
policies of other nations.' 76 This has led many scholars and en-
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Fleischer, supra note 163, at 536-37.
172. See International Dolphin Conservation Act § 5(a) (codified at 16
U.S.C.
§ 1385(d)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
173. See id. § 2(a)(1).
174. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2523 ("The trade community's general ani-
mosity toward environmental trade measures has manifested itself in the form
of broadly worded GATT panel rulings that leave little room for future legiti-
mate state action").
175. See Tuna I, supra note 49, 5.27, at 1620.
176. Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 17.
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vironmentalists to criticize GATT for being less than "environ-
ment-friendly.' u77
Some GATT critics have argued forcefully for an amend-
ment to GATT allowing for environmental trade measures in
specialized situations.' 78 Others find inconsistency in the fact
that GATT frowns upon such measures, since the Agreement al-
lows for the use of "force" and the occasional imposition of uni-
lateral trade measures.' 79 Still others point to the irreconcilable
disparity between the objectives of GATT, which are to establish
extremely liberal trade policies, and those of the MMPA, which
strive to improve dolphin stock sustainability throughout the
ETP.l80
Critics of the IDCPA argue that the main reason it was en-
acted was to avoid the embarrassment of another GATT-based
challenge, this time in front of the WTO.' 8 ' This is quite possi-
ble, as there was a general awareness around the international
trade community that Mexico had threatened just such a chal-
lenge in 1995.182 This has never been officially confirmed, how-
ever, as a primary motivation for dropping the embargo.
At any rate, some scholars have the impression that GATT
prefers free trade to an individual country's right to protect the
global environment.' 8 3 The IDCPA espouses this view to the ex-
177. See generally Steinberg, supra note 56, at 264; Mayer & Hoch, supra
note 10, at 192.
178. Mayer & Hoch, propound as follows:
We conclude that the GAIT should be amended to allow for some ex-
tra-territorial applications of domestic environmental law, especially
where resources being protected are part of the international com-
mons. We also conclude that for free trade to be consistent with sus-
tainable development, some domestic trade measures-including some
forms of subsidy, tariff, or embargo-based on methods of production
must be provided for in the GATT to assure that global development is
also sustainable development.
Mayer & Hoch, supra note 10, at 192.
179. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2540. GATT permits "the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties in response to subsidies granted by foreign governments" and
"permissible product standa-ds 'force' other states to take certain steps, pre-
sumably with the objective of changing the producers' behavior and policies."
Id.
180. See Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 19.
181. See Administration Official Urges Rapid Passage of Tuna/Dolphin
Bill, supra note 34, at 764.
182. See id.
183. See Fox, supra note 68, at 2532 (contending that such a premise "de-
serves serious scrutiny"). See also Mayer & Hoch, supra note 10, at 192 ("for
free trade to be consistent with sustainable development, some domestic trade
measures.., must be provided for in the GATT to assure that global develop-
ment is also sustainable development").
[Vol. 7:431
MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION AcT
tent that it permits immediate trade, with the possibility of an-
other embargo addressing only environmental interests.184
Loosening the definition of dolphin-safe is also a step to toward
better trade relations. However, under the more liberal defini-
tion, the interests of dolphins are still being recognized, since no
tuna haul in which dolphins were "killed or seriously injured"
will be labeled "dolphin-safe."1 85 The bycatch provisions also
give credence to environmental interests heretofore unas-
serted. 86 The IDCPA may not conform with GATT in that uni-
lateral environmental trade measures may be reinstated if the
1997 amendments fail.' 8 7 Nonetheless, the current policy,
which allows for bargaining and encourages trade negotiations
to acknowledge the environmental goals of the MMPA, is an un-
mistakable improvement upon the previous enforcement policy,
which required environmental compliance on the United States'
terms.
Some may say the lives of dolphins are being compromised
for an increase in trade revenues. This is a shortsighted argu-
ment, however, because if the embargo were re-implemented
and the MMPA were challenged again before the WTO, the stat-
ute would face dispute resolution panel rejection. If that oc-
curred, even though the statute would still exist, compliance
would be minimal, and dolphins could be threatened to the point
of extinction, absent the voluntary good will of ETP nations. As
such, the compromise struck for the sake of GATT compliance is
certainly a step in the right direction.
184. This goes to the heart of the legislative debate over the bill. Some crit-
ics considered the sudden emphasis on trade over continued compliance with
traditional environmental standards as the selling out of U.S. sovereignty for
the mere purpose of gaining new trade partners and improving relations with
old ones. See Bill Permitting Tuna Imports Passes House of Representatives, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 955 (May 28, 1997). Hence, the country aban-
dons an important environmental law because its dominant political and eco-
nomic interests do not want to jeopardize relations with Mexico for the sake of a
few dolphins. See Iliff, supra note 4, at 27 (quoting Earth Island Institute execu-
tive director David Phillips). On the other hand, proponents of the bill, such as
Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, stated that the slightly revised agenda was
favorable because it protected dolphins on a sound scientific basis and respected
the rights of other countries at the same time. See Compromise on Tuna/
Dolphin Bill Approved Unanimously by Senate, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
32, at 1354 (Aug. 6, 1997).
185. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 5(a) (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
186. See id. sec. 15, § 7(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 962).
187. See id. sec. 303(c)(1), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c)(1)).
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Noncompliance with GATT, and a probable third complaint
in front of a dispute resolution panel, are likely if the embargo is
implemented again in 1999 or 2001. Unilateralism, violative of
the spirit of cooperation underlying GATT, would again form the
basis of the Act. Again, the Panel would invoke its limited inter-
pretation of Articles XX(b) and XX(g), concluding that the
United States violated the Agreement by attempting to "control
the production or consumption of an exhaustible natural re-
source" outside its jurisdictional reach.188 The United States
and ETP dolphins would be in the same positions they were in
1991. Even if the statute survived such a challenge, the re-
implemented embargo would still represent a process-based ban,
and not one centered on the product itself. The process-product
distinction would become an issue again. As such, trade propo-
nents looking to the future of the IDCPA may not be entirely
satisfied with the terms of the amendments.
At least some reliance on the voluntary compliance of ETP
countries is necessary if the Act's objectives are to be fulfilled.
Although such reliance may weaken slightly the trade propo-
nents' positioning relative to environmentalists, the situation is
certainly preferable to foregoing trade altogether. At worst,
under the new Act the international tuna market will experi-
ence no more than a short-term gain. At best, the market will
experience continuous long-term growth. Either way, trade in-
terests win to some extent. Although it is not stated in the Act
(for obvious reasons), one goal of amending the MMPA should be
to quiet any controversy surrounding it in an attempt to further
international trade and compliance with dolphin protection
measures. In order to reach that goal, short-term risk may be
necessary.
D. DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA Is NOT REALLY THAT DOLPHIN-SAFE
Critics of eco-labeling and the dolphin-safe label in general
have suggested that the average consumer is defrauded when
buying tuna marked with the dolphin safe label.18 9
Consumers are unaware of the real truth behind the label. Since the
time the dolphin-safe tuna label was implemented, consumers have
been under the false impression that dolphins were no longer being
encircled or drowned in tuna nets in the ETP. Nothing is further from
188. See Tuna II, supra note 65, 1 5.28, at 1620.
189. See Damien Lewis, Doubt Cast on Claims For 'Dolphin-Friendly' Tuna,
NEW SCIENTIST, May 9, 1992, at 10 (reporting that the Whale and Dolphin Con-
servation Society of Great Britain determined that there is no way to be com-
pletely confident that tuna or cannery practices are entirely "dolphin-friendly").
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the truth-dolphins were and are still dying in tuna nets. The dolphin
safe label [under the MMPA] does not guarantee that no dolphins died
because ... fishing methods deemed "dolphin safe". . . can still result
in dolphin deaths and be labeled as "dolphin safe."190
Although dolphin mortality levels have decreased significantly,
the relative number of sets undertaken by ETP countries really
has not changed much since the 1980s. 191 What has changed,
rather, is the method of setting, which has become much more
dolphin-friendly.
The confusion over the meaning of "dolphin-safe" is cer-
tainly valid. If consumers feel puzzled or misled by dolphin-safe
labeling, they probably will be less likely to spend the extra
money on dolphin-safe tuna, thereby compromising the effective-
ness of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, the
IDCPA, and trade profits in general. 192 The IDCPA handles this
controversy well by specifically stating that no dolphins will
have died in any dolphin-safe tuna haul should the new defini-
tion be adopted in 1999 or 2001.193 This is by far the most com-
pelling reason for striving to make the IDCPA work. It assures
clarity, and, thus, support, for the fundamental purposes under-
lying a dolphin-safe label.
Some argue that changing the definition of dolphin-safe will
have exactly the opposite effect because consumers will become
confused between the old and new standards. 194 This argument
underestimates the intelligence of the average consumer and ig-
nores the purpose behind changing the standards in the first
place. The perception of consumers is what legislators and lob-
byists are trying to protect by changing the labeling. If the la-
bels are clear and conform with FTC standards, potential
confusion will not be an obstacle to adopting the new definition.
The drafters of the IDCPA succeeded in addressing a major com-
plaint about the MMPA in the straightforward and carefully
crafted language defining "dolphin-safe."
Unfortunately, the IDCPA still allows the Secretary to
grant specialized permits. The IDCPA only changed the terms
190. Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 97, at 3 (statement of Nina
Young).
191. See id.
192. See Subcommittee Hearings I, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of Su-
zanne Iudicello) ("As a practical matter, maintaining consumer confidence is
essential to promoting the stable political and commercial climate that is a req-
uisite for a workable and lasting solution to the tuna/dolphin problem").
193. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 5(a) (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(1)(D) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
194. See Ramach, supra note 12, at 774.
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of the permits. Previously, the Secretary had the power to au-
thorize "general permits for the taking of... marine mammals"
which were of unspecified duration. 195 The IDCPA restricts
these permits to a duration of one year.196 The value of this dif-
ference is unclear, however, as the harmful takings still occur
either way. This is a weakness shared by the MMPA and the
IDCPA. It seems counterproductive to take such care in defin-
ing "dolphin-safe" and then allow special interests to ignore the
specifically drafted terms. One goal of the IDCPA should be to
eradicate blatant inconsistencies such as these. Exceptions to
the rule only weaken it.
E. CAN WE TRUST THE OBSVEVRS?
The observer requirement has always been a part of the
MMPA, and it has also been one of the statute's most questioned
provisions. 197 Fishing captains and government officials in ETP
countries have pressured observers to alter their reports, caus-
ing legitimate questions about the validity of reported dolphin
kill rates.'98 Likewise, observers have reported harassment by
crew members and frequent attempts to bribe them into lower-
ing their report statistics.' 9 9 Some tuna fleet employees have
even threatened observers on board with seal bombs.200 One
cannot assume that all those threatened reported the harass-
ment and continued to perform their job in a legal and proper
manner. As such, it is somewhat disheartening to think about
the number of dolphin deaths which may have gone unreported
and unpunished.
The IDCPA retains the observer requirement, 201 so its
drafters must have faith in the dolphin observers and their abil-
ity to carry out their duties in spite of intimidation. However,
Congress has not spoken officially on the realistic ability of one
observer to effectively monitor an entire purse seine net.20 2 The
nets can be up to one mile in circumference, and injured or dis-
195. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(1) (1994).
196. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 4(d) (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 1374(h)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
197. See Kubasek et al, supra note 3, at 5.
198. See Shannon Brownlee, A Political Casserole of Tuna and Greens, U.S.
NEWS & WoRLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997, at 53.
199. See Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 5-6.
200. See id.
201. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec.
303(a)(2)(B)(i), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(2)(B)(i)).
202. See Ramach, supra note 12, at 767.
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oriented dolphins can die from entanglement in the net after
they have escaped its clutches, making them easy targets for
sharks and other predators.20 3 Because the dolphin-safe stan-
dard could be changed to an "actual death or injury" standard20 4
in the near future, it is critical that observers be able to guaran-
tee that no dolphins died in the haul. At the very least, each
vessel should have multiple observers so that the great expanse
of ocean covered by the net can be more effectively monitored.
F. A CONFLICT OF INTEREST FOR THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE?
Under the terms of the MMPA, as well as the IDCPA, the
Secretary of Commerce is trusted with assuring compliance with
the statute through the continuous protection of marine mam-
mals in the ETP.205 However, in the general scheme of govern-
ment, the Secretary is also responsible for increasing trade
levels through "promoting and protecting the interests" of vari-
ous industries, including tuna harvesting.20 6 Some critics have
argued that this presents an inherent conflict of interest for the
Secretary.207 To some, the whole regime suggests that the sec-
retary will exercise considerable discretion in protecting both in-
dustry and dolphins by selectively choosing which information
to use when engaging in regulatory activities. 208
Critics feel it is contrary to the purpose of the MMPA for the
Secretary to do anything besides ensure the continued protec-
tion of dolphins, as "[tihe statutory duty of the Secretary is...
mandatory, not discretionary."20 9 Industrial interests should be
served, according to some, only after the recognition and fulfill-
ment of marine mammals' needs. 210 The dolphins are entitled
203. See Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 5.
204. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act § 5(a) (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)).
205. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1064; International Dolphin Conservation
Program Act sec. 303(a), § 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)).
206. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1064.
207. See Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 10 (stating that the attempt to
balance the protection of marine mammals and the interests of big business
usually leads to the marine mammals losing out); Miller, supra note 2, at 1079
("Inevitably, the Secretary will also consider the interests of the commercial
fishing industry when promulgating regulations and permitting incidental
takings").
208. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1081.
209. Id. at 1084 (citing Japan Salmon Fisheries v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp.
37, 47 (D.D.C. 1987)).
210. See Coulston, supra note 168, at 109.
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to more protection than that which conveniently furthers com-
mercial fisheries' interests. 211 Of course, if the Secretary
adopted this viewpoint to its fullest extent, the commercial sec-
tors of the economy would have a legitimate complaint about
their interests being unjustifiably compromised.
Although the IATTC has an influential role in the IDCPA, it
is the Secretary who heads all regulation and research. 212
Hence, despite the recent debates, members of Congress must
still be confident in the Secretary's ability to effectively execute
the conflicting duties without needlessly compromising either
one. The mammals would be better protected, however, if sepa-
rate agencies were appointed to handle the conflicting interests
of industry and marine life.
Some critics suggest that the Marine Mammal Commission
(MMC) should be left to handle all regulatory and management
matters for the dolphins, since it is not subject to as much pres-
sure from powerful fishing interests as some other agencies and
administrative bodies. 213 This is the most feasible alternative.
Compromise between industry and environmentalism can only
go so far. After that, a definite delineation becomes necessary.
Either the MMC should be given this responsibility or special
commissions representing the potentially opposing interests
should be created, with the Secretary overseeing the internal
processes of the regulatory body or bodies. That way, the Secre-
tary can retain a leadership role without being directly sub-
jected to the lobbying pressures of environmental and fishing
groups. Such an option centralizes management in that the Sec-
retary can act as an advisor or administrator of sorts, with com-
mission members directly applying the amendment. Another
possibility is to transfer dolphin protection duties to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency or a separately created agency un-
related to the Commerce Department. At any rate, some
division of responsibilities would decrease the conflict of interest
that the Secretary faces.
211. See id.
212. See International Dolphin Conservation Program Act secs. 303, 304,
§ 6(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1413, 1414a (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
213. See Kubasek et aL, supra note 3, at 22. The MMC was established by
the Marine Mammal Protection Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1407 (1994). It ad-
vises the President on how government policies and programs can help in the
conservation of marine mammals. See id. § 1402.
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G. BYCATCH REDUCTION ISSUES
It has become painfully clear that "dolphin-safe" does not
necessarily mean "whale-safe," "sea turtle-safe," or "baby tuna-
safe."214 Unfortunately, statistics suggest that bycatch levels
are lowest when traditional, dolphin-unsafe purse seine meth-
ods are used, and highest when dolphin-safe log sets are used.2 15
Often, the bycatch species' populations are more endangered
than that of the dolphins.2 16 In the case of younger tuna, over-
fishing seriously threatens the ability of yellowfin tuna stocks to
replenish and survive. 21 7 Thus, bycatch issues have forced
dolphin activists to recognize that, at some point, it becomes un-
justified to kill other animals for the purpose of saving a
dolphin. 218
Some critics blamed the original MMPA's avoidance of by-
catch issues on its overly narrow focus. 219 Critics called for an
214. See Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 97, at 2 (statement of Nina
Young) ("more needs to be done to protect dolphins and other marine wildlife,
including sharks, billfish, sea turtles, and tuna in the ETP ecosystem").
215. See Joseph, supra note 26, at 20. Some stocks threatened by dolphin
safe practices include small tunas, mahi mahi, sharks, wahoo, rainbow runners,
billfish, sea turtles, and triggerfish. See id. at 21. For example, the estimated
number ofjuvenile tuna killed in 10,000 sets by dolphin-unsafe fishing methods
is around 70,000, and the estimated number killed with log sets is over 130
million. See id. Similarly, approximately 100 sea turtles are killed in every
10,000 dolphin fishing sets, but over 1000 are killed with log fishing. See id.
216. See Betsy Carpenter, What Price Dolphin?, 116 U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. 71, June 13, 1994, at 71, 71.
217. See Pedrozo, supra note 36, at 111. Tuna often swim under logs float-
ing on the surface of the water when dolphins are not available. Log setting
refers to the practice of placing purse seine nets over logs in the water in order
to catch the tuna below. Pedrozo estimates that tuna stocks in the ETP could
be cut in half by the year 2000 should the level of bycatch remain as it was
under the original MMPA. See id. The IATTC has estimated that if only log
sets were used, fishermen would discard between 10 and 25 million juvenile
yellowfin tuna, which would decrease the total recruitment of the species by 13
to 32 percent and potentially cause a 25 to 60 percent drop in tuna hauls. See
Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 97, at 8 (statement of Nina Young).
218. See Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 122, at 339 ("the ecological
value of saving one dolphin must be ascertained. Another question to be an-
swered is whether or not such a value justifies the taking of a number of indi-
viduals of other species living in the same environment"). It has been estimated
that the cost of saving a single dolphin statistically translates to killing "15,620
small tunas, 382 mahi-mahi, 190 wahoo, 8 rainbow runners, 11 blacktip sharks,
4 silky sharks, 2 whitetip sharks, 2 other sharks and rays, 1 marlin, 428 trig-
gerfishes, 800 other small fish, and approximately 1 sea turtle." Subcommittee
Hearings II, supra note 97, at 8 (statement of Nina Young) (citing statistics
from a presentation by Dr. Martin Hall at the 57th meeting of the IATTC (Oct.
21-23, 1996)).
219. See Alker, supra note 25, at 531.
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ecosystem-based approach rather than a species-by-species ap-
proach to marine mammal conservation. 220 The MMPA never
included specific measures recognizing that the marine life pop-
ulation needed comprehensive support.221 After all, the acciden-
tal killing of sea turtles and sharks could lead to their accidental
extinction, just as was feared for dolphins.222
Both domestic and foreign entities introduced measures to
save "forgotten" sea life prior to the IDCPA. For instance, in
1993, Mexican government officials mandated the use of "turtle
excluder devices" on all commercial shrimp boats sailing in the
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.2 23 Mexico has also
banned the harvesting of specific turtles altogether and refuses
to trade turtle shells and skins with Japan. 224 Unfortunately,
efforts in the United States have not been quite as effective. 225
The 1988 and 1994 amendments to the MMPA required the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service to cooperate with industries in
adopting methods for bycatch reduction. 226 Although these ini-
tially received a warm response from U.S. fishing fleets, the re-
search was never diligently performed.227 This suggests that
one or both parties were not dedicated to the idea. Measures
allowing for ongoing supervision are necessary in order to as-
sure long-term compliance.
The bycatch protection measures gain more validity under
the IDCPA, especially since proponents of the amendments of-
fered bycatch considerations as a primary reason for adopting
the amendments in the first place. 228 Two problems arise, how-
ever. First, bycatch reduction is not mandatory. The IDCPA re-
quires that the Secretaries of State and Commerce merely "seek,
in cooperation with other nations whose vessels fish for tuna in
the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, to establish standards and
measures for a bycatch reduction program for vessels fishing for
yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean." 229 There is
220. See Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 122, at 339.
221. See Alker, supra note 25, at 532.
222. See Kubasek et al., supra note 3, at 14.
223. See Fact Sheet: Mexico's Marine Conservation Efforts, supra note 106,
at 18.
224. See id.
225. See Alker, supra note 25, at 554.
226. See id. at 553-54.
227. See id. at 554.
228. See Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 97, at 7-9 (statement of Nina
M. Young).
229. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act sec. 15, § 7(c) (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C.A. § 962 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)) (emphasis added).
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no guarantee that the United States government will take this
provision any more seriously than it took the ones enacted in
1988 and 1994.
Second, nothing ensures that countries will abide by the
standards even if they are adopted, given the absence of enforce-
ment mechanisms. Although ongoing supervision seems neces-
sary, the terms of the IDCPA do not provide for it. Countries are
required only to seek to establish an agreement which will hold
them to a promise to reduce various bycatch "to the maximum
extent practicable." 230 This is a very malleable and evasive
standard, to say the least. In order to ensure compliance, the
IDCPA should contain definite terms for reduction similar to the
"comparable measures" language of the pre-amendment
MMPA.231
Another problem with the bycatch provision lies in the fact
that there is no guarantee that bycatch levels will fall just be-
cause purse seine fishing is no longer banned.232 Fishermen
often engage in dolphin setting and log setting at the same
time.233 The effect will be a negligible decrease in bycatch
levels, unless all countries develop marine life safeguards like
those applied towards sea turtles in Mexico. However, because
no specific terms exist regarding how bycatch reduction is to be
achieved, these successful safeguards remain options for ETP
countries. They are not mandated. Hopefully, countries inter-
acting with the Secretaries of State and Commerce in this mat-
ter will voluntarily follow Mexico's lead. Self-motivated action of
this sort would certainly help, since required measures for re-
ducing bycatch levels in the ETP nations could be regarded as a
unilateral imposition on LDCs in violation of GATT. 234
IV. CONCLUSION
What does all this mean for international trade in general?
Is the MMPA experience a model for global compromise? It cer-
tainly shows compromise is possible, but it has taken a great
deal of time, tapped legislative energy, and many dolphins have
died in the meantime. Furthermore, although it is an improve-
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing the "compara-
ble measures" standard).
232. See Brownlee, supra note 198, at 53.
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing the GATT's
distaste for unilateralism in general).
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ment from a trade advocate's point of view, it is not ideal for
international commercial interests. The possibility of strictly
short-term gain, a somewhat disheartening scenario from a
GATT standpoint, depends largely on the voluntary good will of
LDCs. Yet, trust is a key component to any successful agree-
ment, and gaining the trust of the United States could give ETP
countries the confidence necessary to ensure compliance. More
importantly, trade has been restored, albeit possibly only tempo-
rarily. Something is better than nothing in most cases, includ-
ing this one.
Alternatively, perhaps the MMPA provides a lesson to inter-
national policymakers and lawmakers about the value of pa-
tience and willingness to respect each side of an argument.
Either way, the IDCPA promises to show that virtually dichoto-
mous objectives can be melded into a coherent agreement. Par-
ties must be willing to work hard and commit themselves to the
issue in order to achieve long-term success.
In general, the future looks good for dolphins and other
marine life under the International Dolphin Conservation Pro-
gram Act. The law responds, at least to some extent, to all the
primary criticisms and concerns that have haunted the MMPA
and its amendments. The only areas in which the IDCPA seems
less in tune with common criticism are in assessing the viability
of observer action and in the conflict of interest facing the Secre-
tary of Commerce. As amendments to the MMPA go, this set
seems to have more potential than the rest. Despite these con-
cerns, it will be refreshing to see at least temporary closure to a
debate that has persisted for so long. The lessons to be learned
from these amendments are yet to be told, but at least it is clear
that compromise is possible when international trade and envi-
ronmental interests go head to head.
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